Social and Economic Networks
PhD in Economics, Stanford University, 2016
(Advisor: Matthew Jackson)
MA and BA in Economics, BS in Mathematics, Peking University
Who Shares Risk with Whom and How? Endogenous Matching and Selection of Risk Sharing Equilibria
- presented at Stanford, Cambridge, Johns Hopkins, Peking U, HKU, CUHK
A Theory of Efficient Negotiations (with Matthew Jackson and Hugo Sonnenschein)
- presented at Chicago, Johns Hopkins, Stanford, Princeton, Yale, AEA, Decentralization Conference.
Intermediated Implementation (with Anqi Li, updated March 2017, submitted)
- presented at AEA, ES Summer Meeting, SED, Michigan, UPenn, Stanford.
Optimal Ordering in Sequential Auctions (with Fanqi Shi, updated May 2017, submitted)
- presented at Johns Hopkins, Stanford, ES Asia Meeting.
Culture-dependent Strategies in Coordination Games (with Matthew Jackson), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 111:3, pp.10889-10896, 2014
Ordering Sellers in Sequential Auctions (with Qiang Gong and Xu Tan), Review of Economic Design, Vol. 18.1, pp.11-35, 2013
Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders (with Xu Tan), Economics Letters, Vol. 111.1, pp.99-103, 2011
Other Publications, Book Chapters, etc.|
'Wave Phenomena' and Formation of Excess Capacity (with Justin Yifu Lin and Ho-Mou Wu), Economic Research Journal (in Chinese), Vol. 10, pp.4-19, 2011
Status quo, History and Thoughts on House Site, as Chapter 4 in The Road to Property Rights Delineation: Experience of Chengdu, China, Peking University Press, 2010
Research in Progress|
Sustaining Cooperation with Multiple Relationships (with Chen Cheng)
Excessive Diversification and Endogenous Riskiness in Financial Networks
Stable Networks with Local Social Rankings
A Screening Perspective on China's Experimental Reform (with Chen Cheng)