December 10, 2001
VOL. 31, NO. 14
|
|
|
Johns Hopkins Bioterrorism Study Dispels 'Panic'
Myth
Researchers suggest ways to involve public in
response to attack
By Tim Parsons Bloomberg School of Public
Health
|
|
Planners and policy-makers have long discounted the
public's ability to participate in a response to
bioterrorism because of a belief that an attack would create
mass panic and social disorder. However, researchers at the
Bloomberg School of Public
Health who reviewed the public's response to the
terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, the recent anthrax mailings
and other disasters concluded that the public reacts with
effective and adaptive action and can be a valuable response
force, which should be considered in biodefense planning.
The study will appear in the Jan. 15, 2002, edition of
Clinical Infectious Diseases.
In addition, the researchers recommend to biodefense
planners five guidelines for limiting panic and effectively
managing the public during an attack:
First, understand
that public panic is rare and preventable. "It is a myth
that a community's first response to a crisis is panic. Yet
bioterrorism contingency planners have too frequently
incorporated the images of a hysterical or lawless mob in
their discussions and response exercises. They have made no
efforts to capitalize upon the constructive reactions that
tend to dominate community responses to crisis, as borne out
by history," says Monica Schoch-Spana, the study's co-author
and a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins
Center for
Civilian Biodefense Strategies. "Although we do not know
how people would respond in an unprecedented biological
attack, we have found that people usually adapt to a
situation based on the best information available, and they
often try to assist one another through a crisis."
Leaders must provide
timely, accurate information and instructions during an
attack so that the public can make decisions on how to
protect themselves, according to Schoch-Spana and her
co-author, Thomas Glass, an assistant professor of
epidemiology at the Bloomberg School of Public Health.
Biodefense planners also must create for the public a
constructive role, which should be closely based on existing
social structures and routines.
"People tend to stick to the standards of civil
behavior and their normal social roles even under the most
challenging circumstances," Glass says. "Following the
anthrax attacks, sales of Ciproflaxacin and gas masks
increased dramatically. This was not a panic reaction. Based
on the circumstances, many people reasonably thought this
was the best way to protect themselves, their families and
their children."
Biodefense planners
should recognize the public as an active participant in
responding to an attack. Volunteers and organizations rushed
to ground zero to help survivors of the World Trade Center
attacks, despite the dangers, the researchers point out.
Schoch-Spana led a rapid response research team to New York
following the attacks, documenting the creative and
resourceful ways people have organized themselves to offer
assistance over the short and long term. Similarly, in the
bioterrorism context, civic organizations such as churches,
charities and associations could be used to distribute
information and medications, and to monitor for disease
outbreaks.
Biodefense planners
must not rely solely on the hospital system to care for the
sick during a bioterrorism disaster. "Hospitals today
operate on a 'just-in-time' principle to deliver care. They
do not have enough doctors, nurses, beds or equipment to
care for a massive surge of patients. We will need to rely
on volunteers and nonprofessionals to deliver some care and
use community groups as we once did during the flu pandemic
of 1918 or as the Israeli government did during the Persian
Gulf War," Glass explains.
The researchers stress that information and
communication with the community must be an important
component of biodefense. Inaccurate or contradictory
information could lead to mistrust of authorities,
confusion, panic and increased fear. "Leaders must treat
information as importantly as they treat medicine. Good
communication and practical prevention tips will be vitally
important in successfully dealing with a bioterrorism
attack," Schoch-Spana says.
In addition, there is an urgent need to create an
"information stockpile." Multilingual public service
announcements, leaflets and other materials should be
developed to provide concrete information on vaccines,
antibiotics and exposure risks during a biological
attack.
To develop trust with
the community, the researchers recommend leaders continually
educate the public on preparedness and response plans and
encourage the public's input on important biodefense
planning measures. Leaders also should develop a
collaborative relationship with the news media to ensure an
open flow of information during an emergency.
"For a long time, biodefense planners have viewed the
public as bystanders during a potential crisis, but the
people will play a critical role during a bioterrorism
attack," Glass says. "As we spend another $500 million
buying enough smallpox vaccine to fill several warehouses,
we must at the same time understand that teaching people
concrete and practical steps they can take to avoid becoming
infected or infecting others will remain the first and most
important line of defense in the aftermath of a bioterrorist
attack."
Related Web Sites
Bloomberg School of Public Health
Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense
Strategies
|